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This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of a 
current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public 
goods. In doing so, we derive a [0, 1] number that reveals immediately how far 
the current tax configuration is from the optimal one and, thereby, the degree of 
efficiency of a tax system. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index. We 
show how the basic method can be altered in order to derive a revenue equivalent 
uniform tax, which measures the size of the public sector. A numerical example is 
used to illustrate the method developed. 
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1. Introduction
The present paper contributes to the theory of measuring the eﬃciency costs of
taxes. To address this issue the standard approach in the public ﬁnance literature is
to use the excess burden of taxation, which measures the eﬃciency cost of taxes in
money terms.I nt h i sp a p e r ,w ep r o p o s eanon-money metric aggregate that contains
normative information about the current level of taxes in a quite intuitive way. We
argue that this measure is easy to use for comparisons between countries and over
time.
Despite its wide appeal, the excess burden measure has some well-known defects
in its application. Quoting Auerbach (1985), the excess burden of taxation is deﬁned
"as the amount that is lost in excess of what the government collects. Unfortunately,
while this deﬁnition makes intuitive sense, it is too vague to permit a single interpre-
tation" (p.67). The problem with excess burdeni st h a ti tr e p r e s e n t sam o n e ym e t r i c
aggregate. Moreover, a money metric equivalent of the tax distortion can be derived
both by using an equivalent variation and a compensating variation method. Thus,
while in Mohring (1971) the excess burden is the amount in excess of taxes being
collected that the consumer would give up in exchange for the removal of all taxes
(an equivalent variation calculation), in Diamond and McFadden (1974) the excess
burden is the amount that the government must supply to the consumer to allow her
to maintain the initial level of utility (a compensating variation calculation). The
results, as we know, diﬀer. More importantly, and independently of which method
we use, comparisons of diﬀerent countries’ excess burdens h o u l db ed o n ew i t hc a r ea s
issues, such as using a purchasing power parity corrected exchange rate, are involvedtax optimality index 3
(see Neary, 2004).
In the present paper we suggest a measure of tax eﬃciency that is not expressed
in money terms and is therefore easy to use for international and inter-temporal
comparisons. Building on distance function techniques recently utilized by Anderson
and Neary (1996), we propose an index that measures the welfare burden of a given
tax conﬁguration as its distance from optimal taxes (where the welfare burden is
t a k e nt ob ez e r o ) .W ec a l li tt h eTax Optimality Index (TOI). Our measure has an
immediate, and intuitive, interpretation: for example, a TOI equal to 0.6 implies that
current taxes are 60% eﬃcient, or, in other words, that a 40% reduction of optimal
tax rates will reduce welfare to the level that exists at the current tax rates. Being
a distance measure of tax eﬃciency, it is not expressed in money terms and can be
directly compared between diﬀerent countries and/or time periods.
In addition to the TOI, we also propose a Revenue Equivalent Uniform Tax
(REUT) measure to address an issue frequently considered in public economics, viz.
the uniform tax rate that keeps the provision of public goods unchanged. This cor-
responds to a reform of taxes that changes the non-uniform initial tax structure to a
uniform one that yields the same amount of tax revenues and thus the same provi-
sion of public goods (a ﬂat-tax type of reform). The resulting uniform tax rate is a
convenient and easily interpreted measure of the size of the public sector.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The model of a small open econ-
omy with public good provision and distortionary taxation is presented in section
2. Section 3 contains the deﬁnition of the tax optimality index, its properties and
its interpretation. The derivation of the revenue-equivalent average tax is presentedtax optimality index 4
in section 4. To illustrate the techniques used, a numerical example is presented in
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. A Small Open Economy with Public Good Production
Consider a small open economy that faces ﬁxed world prices on goods that it trades
with the rest of the world. Assume that the number of traded goods is 1+M, with M
being the number of non-numeraire goods. The world prices of these non-numeraire
goods are denoted by the vector p.1
The government raises revenues by taxing consumption.2 Denote t as the (M ×1)
vector of ad-valorem taxes, which create a wedge between world and producer prices
p and consumer prices q =( 1+t) · p.3 The tax revenues ﬁnance the production of a
public good g that is returned to consumers free of charge.
We assume the existence of a representative agent that achieves utility level u
by consuming private and public goods and raising income through its (ﬁxed) fac-
tor supply. The consumer decisions are characterized by the expenditure function
e(q,g,u), which denotes the minimum expenditure needed to achieve utility level u,
given consumer prices q =( 1+t)·p and a level g of the public good.4 Standard prop-
erties of this function (see Dixit and Norman, 1980, Woodland, 1982, and Cornes,
1We use the ﬁrst of the traded goods as a numeraire, its price being normalised to unity. In
addition, it is assumed, without loss of generality, that this good is not taxed. Unless otherwise
mentioned, all vectors are taken to be column vectors and the transpose of a vector x is denoted by
x
0.
2Extending the model to include both income taxes and consumption taxes is straightforward
and therefore delegated to the appendix. Similarly, taxes and subsidies on international trade can
easily be incorporated into the model.
3The notation “·” denotes the horizontal product of two vectors; if z = x · y then zi = xiyi.I n
the expression for q, 1 is a vector of ones.
4The unit price of the numeraire good is also an argument of the expenditure function, but it is
supressed for simplicity. We do the same to the revenue function with respect to both the price of
the numeraire good and the (ﬁxed) factor endownments vector.tax optimality index 5
1992) imply that eq ≡ ∂e/∂q is the vector of compensated demand functions for the
private goods, −eg is the marginal willingness to pay for the public good and eu is
the inverse of the marginal utility of income.5
Let the restricted revenue function r(p,g) denote the value of total income gen-
erated in the private sector given producer prices p and the level of the provision
of the public good g. The gradient of this function with respect to producer prices
(rp ≡ ∂r/∂p) gives the vector of domestic supplies of private goods and rg is the
supply shadow price of the public good (−rg > 0 is the unit cost of producing the
public good). It is assumed that the production technology exhibits constant returns
to scale technology, implying that rgg ≡ ∂2r/∂g2 =0 .
In describing the equilibrium of this economy we use the private sector’s net
expenditure function E deﬁned as
E((1 + t) · p, g, u)=e((1 + t) · p, g, u) − r(p, g). (1)
Thus, net expenditure is the consumer’s expenditure on private goods minus the
revenue earned by the production sector from the sale of private goods. As is well
known, the price gradient Ep = ep − rp is the vector of utility-compensated excess
demands. The derivative −Eg = −eg−(−rg) denotes the wedge between the marginal
willingness to pay for the public good (−eg > 0) and the marginal cost of producing
it (−rg > 0). Clearly, if this wedge is positive (negative) an extra unit of the public
5The term eg represents the reduction in expenditure on the private goods as a result of an extra
unit consumption of the public good, holding utility level constant. In that sense, eg is the shadow
demand price of the public good and −eg(> 0) is then the marginal willingness to pay for the public
good.tax optimality index 6
good will increase (decrease) welfare.6
The equilibrium of our economy is described by the following two equations:
E((1 + t) · p, g, u)=−rg(p, g)g (2)
(t · p)
0 ep = −rg(p, g)g. (3)
The ﬁrst equation is the private sector’s budget constraint expressed in domestic
prices. It demands that the extra money consumers spent on private goods (extra in
the sense that is in addition to the income that they earn by working in the private
sector) comes from working in the public sector (−rgg is the total cost of producing
g units of the public good, which, under the assumption of constant returns to scale,
is equal to total income generated in that sector). The second equation is the public
sector budget constraint, equating tax revenues and total public sector costs. Given
world prices p and the tax vector t, these two equations simultaneously determine
the level of utility u and the level of provision of public goods g.
The public sector budget constraint (3) may be solved for the quantity of the
public good g as a function of t and u,i . e .g = g(t, u). Substituting this solution
into equation (2) and re-writing the private sector budget constraint as the balance
of trade function B(t, u), we obtain:
B(t, u) ≡ E((1 + t) · p,g(t, u),u )+rg(p, g(t, u))g(t, u)=0 . (4)
6The condition −Eg =0(i.e. −eg = −rg,o rMRS = MRT) is the so-called Samuelson rule for
optimal public good provision in a closed economy without distortionary taxation. This rule does
not apply here as we consider a small open economy with distortionary taxation.tax optimality index 7
Equation (4) represents the general equilibrium budget constraint for the economy,
making sure that the public good market is in equilibrium and that consumers and
the government cannot spend more money than they earn. It is expressed in terms
of the tax rates and the level of utility. The utility level that satisﬁes equation (4) is
given by the indirect utility function expressed as u = U(t).
3. The Tax Optimality Index
Having expressed the economy’s equilibrium with a single compact equation (4), we
now construct a measure of the eﬃciency of the tax structure in the presence of public
goods.
Suppose that we observe a country with tax rates and utility given by (t1,u 1) and
a level of public good provision given by g1 = g(t1,u 1).L e t (t0,u 0) be the welfare
maximizing choice of taxes and corresponding utility level and let the corresponding
optimal public good provision be g0 = g(t0,u 0). This welfare optimal solution is
obtained by maximizing the indirect utility function U(t) with respect to the tax
vector t, yielding solution t0. The objective is to obtain a measure of how well
the observed tax-public good situation compares with the optimal tax-public good
solution.
With these preliminaries in hand, we can now deﬁne the Tax Optimality Index






δ : B(δt 0,u 1)=0 ,δ> 0
ª
. (5)
The solution δ0 to this problem determines a tax vector e t1 ≡ δ0t0 that yields thetax optimality index 8
reference utility level u1. This new tax vector has the property that it is a contraction
of the optimal tax vector t0 towards the origin and thus lies on the ray from the origin
to t0 in tax space. The solution δ0 to the minimization problem in (5) is the scaling




is the proportion of the optimal tax vector that achieves the same level of
welfare u1 as achieved by the observed tax vector t1.7
If the economy is already at the welfare optimum, then t1 = t0 and u1 = u0 and
so the index takes a value of unity. If the country is not at the welfare optimum, its
level of utility is u1 <u 0 and so a proportionally smaller vector of tax rates than t0
will allow the country to maintain its level of utility u1.8 Our index will therefore be
less than unity. In an extreme case, the observed tax vector is t1 =0and there is a
zero provision of public goods g1 =0 . In this case, the solution to the above problem
is δ0 =0and so the tax optimality index takes the value of zero. Thus, in short, the
tax optimality index T
¡
t0,u 1¢
ranges from zero to unity. Zero indicates that there
is, eﬀectively, no public sector in the observed situation. Unity indicates that the
government’s choice of taxation rates (and hence the provision of public goods) is
optimal. In between, a higher index indicates greater proximity to the optimum. We
can refer to this index, therefore, as a Tax Optimality Index (TOI).
7This deﬁnition of the TOI is expressed as a distance function in tax space. Anderson and
Neary (1996) use a distance function in commodity price space to derive measures of the trade
restrictiveness of tariﬀs, but their measure can also be expressed in tax space. Chau et.al (2003)
u s ed i s t a n c ef u n c t i o n si nq u a n t i t ys p a c et od e r i v em e a s u r e so fe c o n o m i ci n e ﬃciency of tariﬀs. These
authors provide also a comparison between their eﬃciency measure and the coeﬃcient of resource
utilisation (Debreu, 1951), the open economy index of deadweight loss (Diewert, 1985), and the
well-known equivalent variation measure.
8There will also exist another set of taxes that is higher than t
0 that can maintain the same level
of utility. The index then will be greater than unity, as optimal taxes will have to be inﬂated. Our
deﬁniton, and thus convention, is to consider only the lower than t0 taxes (hence the min in equation































Figure 1: The Tax Optimality Index
The index is illustrated in Figure 1. The ﬁgure depicts iso-utility contours in
a three (two taxable) good small open economy with public good provision. Since
we assume without loss of generality that one good (the numeraire) is not taxed, the
index may be illustrates in the two-dimensional tax space (t2,t 3).P o i n tW represents
the optimal tax situation where non-zero taxes ﬁnance the production of public goods,
while point A is the assumed current tax situation for the economy. The contours
(indiﬀerence curves) show the sets of tax rates that yield various levels of utility,
point W being on the highest feasible indiﬀerence curve.
A proportional contraction of the optimal taxes given by W yield tax vectors
on the ray passing through the origin and W.I n p a r t i c u l a r , o n e s u c h d e ﬂation of
the optimal taxes takes us to point B in Figure 1, which produces the same level of
u t i l i t ya sa tt h ec u r r e n tt a xe q u i l i b r i u mg i v e nb yp o i n tA. The tax optimality index
for the current tax equilibrium is therefore given by the ratio TOI = OB/OW. Thistax optimality index 10
tax vector B,a sd e ﬁned above, is (a) a uniform contraction of the optimal tax vector
and (b) yields the same level of utility as the initial tax situation. It should be noted
that the level of provision of the public good will generally be diﬀerent at points W,
A and B, but these diﬀerences have no bearing on the tax optimality index TOI,
which focuses on welfare alone.9 The TOI index in based on welfare comparisons;
points B and A are welfare equivalent and yield lower welfare than point W.
If the initial tax situation is given by point C,t h es a m ep o i n tB is obtained and
so the index takes the same value as for situation A. This is as it should be; even
though they may produce diﬀerent levels of the public good, both have the same
utility and so they are equal in a welfare sense. At initial situation D, on the other
hand, the level of utility is lower than at A and C a n ds ot h et a xo p t i m a l i t yi n d e xw i l l
also be lower. Tax conﬁguration D is further from the welfare optimum W than are
A and C in the sense that it is on a lower indiﬀerence curve. Its tax optimality index
is given by OF/OW, which is lower than A’s index. In summary, our TOI measures
the distance of any initial tax vector from the optimal tax vector, distance being
measured along the ray OW. This distance, relative to the distance OW, accurately
ranks initial tax situations according to their levels of utility relative to the optimal
utility point W. Thus, we measure the true welfare cost of taxes as the distance from
the optimal tax structure.10
9It is possible, of course, for the level of provision of public goods to be the same at points A and
W. The level of utility at A will be lower than at W by choosing a sub-optimal tax vector to ﬁnance
the public sector.
10As we have mentioned, the techniques we use are based on the work of Anderson and Neary
(1996), whose method measures the welfare-preserving uniform tax when optimal taxes are zero.
However, when optimal taxes are not zero, such a measure may not exist. To see this, consider
Figure 1: clearly the 45 line (which depicts uniform taxes) may not intersect with the iso-utility
contour corresponding to a current tax conﬁguration. The only welfare-preserving tax that we can
always ﬁnd, is the tax that lies on the line that connects the origin with the optimal tax conﬁguration.tax optimality index 11
Note that there can be two scalars that will do the job: if the current tariﬀ
structure is described by point A, the optimal tariﬀ rates can be both proportionally
increased and decreased to get the same utility level (points E and B, respectively).
Our convention is to consider only points on the OW line (that is, only point B is
considered) and then measure the TOI by the ratio OB/OW.
The distance BW measures (in tax space) the loss of welfare associated with
initial point A compared to the best attainable welfare at W.T h e r a t i o BW/OW
can therefore be interpreted as a Tax Ineﬃciency Index (TII).O fc o u r s e ,t h et w o
indices are related by the equation TII =1− TOI.
Some of the properties of the TOI are apparent from the above discussion. The
main properties are brought together as follows:
1. The TOI has the range [0,1]. If an economy has optimal choices of both public
goods provision and commodity tax rates, then TOI =1 . If an economy has
sub-optimal choices of either public goods provision or commodity tax rates,
then TOI <1.
2. The TOI is monotonically increasing in utility. Thus, higher values for TOI
indicate higher welfare; same values for TOI indicate the same level of welfare.
3. The TOI is homogeneous of degree zero in world prices, and hence independent
of the choice of numeraire.
The ﬁrst two properties are easily proved and follow from the deﬁnition of the
The position of this welfare-preserving tax on this line is exactly what our Tax Optimality Index
measures.tax optimality index 12
TOI. The ﬁnal property follows from the homogeneity properties of the revenue and
expenditure functions.11
These properties make the TOI particularly appropriate for measuring the opti-
mality or, conversely, ineﬃciency of tax structures and for undertaking international
or inter-temporal comparisons. Property 2 states that the TOI and the level of
welfare are positively and uniquely related. Thus, in comparing various alternative
tax/public good situations for a given economy the TOI is a perfectly accurate mea-
sure of welfare.12 For example, index calculations of TOI1 =0 .9 and TOI2 =0 .8
indicate that situation 1 is more eﬃcient than situation 2 and that u1 >u 2.
Because the tax optimality index is homogeneous of degree zero in world prices
(Property 3) and so is a "pure number", it can be readily used for comparisons
between diﬀerent countries and/or diﬀerent time periods. Diﬀerent countries may
have diﬀerent preferences and technologies and, thus, diﬀerent optimal taxes and
diﬀerent optimal levels of public good provision. Nevertheless, comparisons on the
basis of the TOI are valid, as the TOI measures the distance of the current tax
structure from its optimal tax conﬁguration. Thus, the TOI can be easily used
to rank countries in terms of distance from optimality. Such rankings of the TOI
generally cannot be translated into welfare rankings, of course.13
11The homogeneity of the TOI in prices follows from the homogeneity properties of the expen-
diture and revenue functions. If all world prices (including the numeraire’s price) are doubled, the
expenditure and revenue via functions e and r, double and, hence, net expenditure via E doubles.
In addition, the shadow supply price rg(p,g) doubles as does tax revenues. Thus, the solution for
the real variables u and g in equations (2) and (3) remain unchanged as a result of the world price
inﬂation. Hence the balance of trade function B(t,u) i sh o m o g e n e o u so fd e g r e ez e r oi np r i c e sa n d
this implies that the TOI is also homogeneous of degree zero in prices.
12Of course, we are dealing with the special case of a single household economy here.
13On the other hand, if two countries have the same technologies, preferences and endowments
then a comparison of their TOIs will enable an accurate welfare comparison. A similar remark applies
to a comparison of the same economy in diﬀerent time periods.tax optimality index 13
When only small tax changes have occurred between time periods, we can use
calculus to uncover some properties of the TOI. Totally diﬀerentiating (5) around the
initial equilibrium, holding t0 ﬁxed, we get that B0
t(δt0,u 1)t0dδ + Bu(δt0,u 1)du =0 .
Total diﬀerentiation of B(t1,u 1)=0yields B0
t(t1,u 1)dt+Bu(t1,u 1)du =0 ,w h i c hm a y
be used to solve for the change in utility consequent upon marginal changes in the






t(e t1,u 1)e t1B0
t(t1,u 1)dt, (6)
where it is recalled that e t1 = δt0.
We can easily see from the above formula that the proportional change of the Tu
deﬂator is related (via a scaling factor - the ﬁrst term) to the weighted average of the
tax changes (dt), with the weights being the marginal welfare eﬀects of taxes (Bt)
evaluated at the initial equilibrium. The structure of these weights in terms of deriv-






rg +( t · p)0epg
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(p · ep)




t denotes the marginal eﬀects of tax changes upon the balance of trade (4),
which can be interpreted as the foreign exchange needed (zero in our case) to sustain
utility u given world prices p, taxes t, and public good provision g. The change in B
following a change in taxes gives the money metric measure of the resulting welfare
eﬀect.14
14Totally diﬀerention of (4) yields
Budu + B
0
tdt =0 ,tax optimality index 14
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of this expression (7) for B0
t gives the "snap-
shot" eﬀect of a tax change, ignoring the general equilibrium eﬀects incorporated in
the remaining term. If only this "snapshot" eﬀect were to be taken into account, the
expression for (6) would be the approximation db Tu/b Tu = −c0dt/c0t,w h e r ec = ep is
the consumption vector at the initial equilibrium. This expression weights the mar-
ginal changes in the tax rates by the consumption vector and measures the (snapshot)
percentage change in consumption tax revenue. While this is easy to compute and
"intuitive", it ignores important general equilibrium eﬀects. The appropriate mar-
ginal index is given by (6) and (7). This is the marginal version of our TOI.
The TOI, as deﬁned above, compares the existing tax situation to the optimal
tax situation. The optimal tax situation is one in which the economy chooses its
consumption tax vector and the level of public good provision to maximize utility.15
A variation on this tax optimality index may be deﬁned for the situation where
the level of public goods provision is not endogenously determined. Consider a tax
structure that maximizes utility subject to the requirement that the level of public
good provision is equal to an exogenously determined public revenue requirement. In
this case, the constrained optimal tax structure maximizes utility u subject to the
where
Bu = eu −
eg
rg +( t · p)0epg
(t · p)
0epu
and Bt is given as (7). The derivative Bu denotes the welfare gain to a unit increase of the economy’s
purchasing power, while B
0
t denotes the marginal welfare eﬀects of tax changes. Since the balance of
trade equation can be interpreted as determining the foreign exchange needed (zero in our case) to
sustain utility u given world prices p, taxes t, and public good provision g,t h ec h a n g ei nB following
a change in taxes gives the money metric measure of the resulting welfare eﬀect. Clearly, and due
to the existence of public goods, B
0
t is not always negative and, thus, an optimal level of taxes can
be derived by setting B
0
t =0 .
15We should clarify here that by optimality we mean a constrained optimality where lump sum
t a x e sd on o te x i s t .tax optimality index 15
private budget constraint (2) in which g = g1 is given, that is, subject to
B(t,u,g1) ≡ E((1 + t) · p, g1,u )+rg(p, g1)g1 =0 . (8)
Call the solution for the tax vector t
0. The constrained tax optimality index (CTOI)






δ : B(δ t
0,u 1,g1)=0 ,δ> 0
o
. (9)
This index measures the eﬃciency or optimality of the existing tax structure
relative to the optimal tax structure that achieves the same public good provision
outcome as the initial equilibrium. If the initial taxes are optimal for this purpose
then the index is unity; if sub-optimal for this purpose, the index is less than one.
This index, therefore, does not assume optimality of the public good provision choice.
4. The Revenue-Equivalent Uniform Tax
We now turn to the case of deriving a uniform tax that holds the provision of public
goods, and thus the tax revenue, constant.16
For this, we use the private sector’s budget constraint (2) to solve for utility u
as a function of t and g,i . e .u = u(t,g), and substitute the solution into the public
sector’s budget constraint (3). Rewriting the public sector budget constraint, we
have:
Π(t,g) ≡ (t · p)
0 ep((1 + t)p, g, u(t, g)) + rg(p, g)g =0 . (10)
16Anderson and Neary (2003) make a similar application in which they keep ﬁxed the initial trade



























Figure 2: The Revenue Equivalent Uniform Tax
Equation (10) represents the general equilibrium public sector budget constraint for
the economy. Denoting by t1 and g1 the current level of taxes and public good
provision, we deﬁne the revenue equivalent uniform tax Tg as
Tg : Π(1 · Tg,g 1)=0 . (11)
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sd e ﬁnition, Tg is the uniform tax rate that will yield the reference
level of public good provision (g1) for the economy. Since this uniform tax rate
satisﬁes the general equilibrium public sector budget constraint (10), both the public
and private sector budget constraints are satisﬁed.
Figure 2 depicts this revenue-equivalent uniform tax (REUT) rate. In the ﬁgure,
point A is the initial tax rate conﬁguration (t1), while W is the optimal vector of
taxes. The contours concentric to point W represent diﬀerent levels of utility. Thetax optimality index 17
locus of points given by the solid curve through point A deﬁnes the set of taxes that
can support the public good provision (g1) given at the initial situation. The shape
of this locus is determined by the general equilibrium public sector budget constraint,
i.e. equation (10), but it will be downward sloping. This constant-g contour cuts the
45 degree line at point A0. Hence, the uniform tax (Tg) that reproduces the same
level of the public good (g1)i st h e ng i v e nb yp o i n tA0. Clearly, imposing this uniform
tax rate may increase or decrease welfare (as Figure 2 is drawn, welfare falls).
We can now use this uniform tax as a measure of the size of the public sector in
diﬀerent time periods within a country or between diﬀerent countries. Even if the
shape of the constant public good locus is not the same between countries, they will all
cut the 45 degree line thus allowing for such a comparison. As an example, consider a
second country’s tax conﬁguration at point B with a constant public good locus given
by the stippled curve, which passes through points B and B0. The second country’s
revenue equivalent uniform tax vector is then B0, which is smaller than A0, and, thus,
the second country B has a smaller public good sector than the ﬁrst country A.W h a t
makes the revenue equivalent uniform tariﬀ the correct tool for comparing the two
countries is, of course, the fact that it takes into account the general equilibrium
eﬀects of changing taxes and is independent of the choice of numeraire.
To put our revenue equivalent uniform tax measure into perspective, we brieﬂy
discuss a somewhat diﬀerent uniform tax used in public ﬁnance, viz. the average
eﬀective tax. The average eﬀective tax (also called, the tax burden) is used to mea-
sure the size of taxation of a particular activity. It is deﬁned as the ratio of tax
revenues over tax base. For the case of, say, consumption taxes, the average eﬀectivetax optimality index 18




C , where ci is the consumption of good
i, ti is the consumption tax rate and C =
P
i(1 + ti)pici is total value of consump-
tion at consumer prices. Thus, the resulting scalar is constructed by using current
tax rates (ti) weighted by current activity information (ci). Clearly, its popularity is
its simplicity: reference to the national statistics of a given country provides all the
information needed for its calculation.17 However, the above method is theoretically
problematic. The use of current activity information is the culprit of a classic index-
number problem: the activity that is highest taxed weighs less in the index! As the
tax on a particular good rises, the weight put on that good (here, its consumption
level) falls. At prohibitively high levels of taxation the weight is zero and thus the
constructed index underestimates the true tax burden in the economy. These are
typical index number problems that could be addressed by applying index number
techniques.18 Clearly, these type of problems do not exist in the calculation of our
revenue-equivalent uniform tax as it uses correct general equilibrium weights.
5. Calculating the TOI: A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the use of the TOI, we present a numerical example. The model
we use has four commodities - three private and one public good. As in our theoretical
17Due to that, the literature on measuring the average eﬀective tax has concentrated on the
details of what should be included in the nominator and denominator of the above expression (a
recent overview can be found in Sørensen, 2004).
18The problem in its basic form is the same as the one encountered in the price index literature
concerning the relation between Paasche, Laspeyres,a n dKonüs Indexes, viz. PL >P K >P P (see
Diewert, 1981). While the former two have the advantage of using easily available information, it is
only the latter that truly expresses the true cost of living. This latter index, however, presupposes
knowledge of the utility function and as such it is diﬃcult to use. The solution is to calculate
the Fisher ideal price index, which is a combination of the Paasche and Laspeyres indexes (PF =
[PLPP]
0.5), and which can closely approximate the Konüs index. Such a development could also be
done in the average eﬀective tax literature, where the current measue underestimates the true tax
burden. A similar procedure, to a diﬀerent issue, is also argued by Cornes (1996).tax optimality index 19
model, the economy is a small open economy with the prices of the private goods
being given by world market conditions. Commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire.
5.1. Production. The production side of the economy is described by the revenue
function R(p,v),w h e r ep is now a vector of producer prices for the four goods and v
is the vector of endowments. There is just one endowment in the numerical model.

















where b =( b1,b 2,b 3,b 4) > 0 and l =( l1,l 2,l 3,l 4) ≤ 0 are vectors of parameters and
v>0 is a scalar. This functional form is linearly homogeneous and convex in prices
(assumed positive, of course). It is increasing in prices over a cone of prices; if l =0








The parameter vector l is introduced to allow an output to be zero. Speciﬁcally, we
might want to set the output of the public good equal to zero, in which case y4 =0 . If
l4 < 0, then there exists a shadow supply price qs
4 such that a zero output is feasible.
More generally, setting g = y4(p,v) we can solve for the shadow supply price for
the public good ps
4, which can then be eliminated from the revenue function to get
the restricted revenue function that we deﬁne in section 2, i.e. r(p1,p 2,p 3,g,v)=
R(p1,p 2,p 3,p s
4(p1,p 2,p 3,g,v),v). We do not have to perform this solution and sub-
stitution analytically as it can be done numerically in the example.tax optimality index 20











u = k(q)+ (q)u,
where a =( a1,a 2,a 3,a 4) > 0 and k =( k1,k 2,k 3,k 4) ≤ 0 are vectors of parameters, d
is a scalar parameter and u>0 is a scalar representing utility. The consumer prices
are denoted by qi =( 1 + ti)pi and t4 =0 . This functional form is linearly homogeneous
and concave in domestic prices (assumed positive, of course). It is increasing in prices
over a cone of prices; if k =0then it is increasing for all positive prices.





which is the linear expenditure system. The parameter vector k is introduced to
allow an output to be zero. Speciﬁcally, we might want to set the quantity of the
public good equal to zero, in which case c4 =0 . If k4 < 0, then there exists a shadow
demand price qd
4 such that a zero output is feasible.
More generally, setting g = c4(q,u) we can solve for the shadow demand price
for the public good qd
4, which can then be eliminated from the expenditure func-
tion to get the expenditure that we deﬁne in section 2, i.e. e(q1,q 2,q 3,g,u)=
e e(q1,q 2,q 3,qd
4(p1,p 2,p 3,g,u),u). Again, we do not have to perform this solution and
substitution analytically as a numerical solution suﬃces.tax optimality index 21
5.3. Parameter Values and Results. The parameter values chosen are given
in table 1:























As seen from the parameter values, we treat private goods (goods 1-3) symmetrically
in our revenue function speciﬁcation, but asymmetry is introduced into preferences
via the choice of the parameter k3 for private good 3. Good 4, the public good,
enters the expenditure function with a larger coeﬃcient (a4), indicating a higher
marginal willingness to pay for the public good than for the private goods. Finally,
we normalize the endowment of the single factor (v) to unity and we set the world
prices of the private goods (p) so that the country exports the numeraire good (good
1) and imports the other two goods (goods 2 and 3) (although the trade pattern does
not matter here).
Table 2 below summarizes the results of the equilibrium for the open economy at
the initial or reference tax vector t1 =[ 0 , 0.16, 0.21]
0 and at the optimal tax vector t0.
In the table, ti,i=2 ,3 are the ad valorem consumption taxes on the non-numeraire
goods, c is the consumption vector, g is the quantity of public production and TIitax optimality index 22
denotes the traditional tax burden indexes.
Table 2: Results
Reference equilibrium Optimal equilibrium
t1
2 =0 .16,t 1
3 =0 .21 t0
2 =0 .2290,t 0
3 =0 .2080
c1
1 =0 .4161,c 1
2 =0 .5124,c 1
3 =0 .5377 c0
1 =0 .4176,c 0
2 =0 .4854,c 0
3 =0 .5414
g1 =0 .1116 g0 =0 .1265
u1 =1 .0601 u0 =1 .0609




At the reference equilibrium, the tax rate on good 2 is signiﬁcantly lower than the
tax rate on good 3. The optimal tax solution reverses this divergence of tax rates and,
due to the asymmetries in the technology and preferences between private goods, the
optimal tax rates are diﬀerent and are given by t0
2 =0 .2290 and t0
3 =0 .2080.T h e
consumer responds by reducing consumption of the good taxed at a higher rate (good
3) and increasing consumption of the other two private goods (good 2’s tax rate being
lowered) compared to the reference situation. The optimal solution calls for a higher
level of public good provision than at the reference equilibrium, and hence a greater
tax revenue (in terms of the numeraire) is required. Of course, the level of utility is
higher at the optimal solution.
Calculating the Tax Optimality Index we ﬁnd that TOI =0 .7972. Thus, we cantax optimality index 23
0 t
1 t%
1 t 0 t
1 t%
1 t
Figure 3: The Tax Optimality Index: Numerical Example
achieve the reference utility u1 by using tax rates that are precisely 0.7972 times the
optimal taxes t0. Thus, we say that the reference point taxes t1 are 79.7% eﬃcient.
In other words, an 20.3% proportionate reduction in the optimal tariﬀs would achieve
the reference utility level u1.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the TOI in tax space. The ﬁgure shows
the reference tax point t1 , the optimal tax point t0 and the constructed tax point
e t1 = TOI ∗ t0. By construction, this tax point lies on the ray through the optimal
tax point.
Figure 4 illustrates the REUT rate. The ﬁgure shows the tax revenue contours in
tax space along with the reference tax point, the optimal tax point and the revenue-
equivalent uniform tax vector. The reference tax rates are t1
2 =0 .16 and t1












Figure 4: Revenue Equivalent Uniform Tax: Numerical Example (labels rounded to
two decimal places)
and public good provision is g1 =0 .1165. The same public good provision may be
attained using a uniform tax rate of Tg =0 .1812. This provides a readily interpreted
measure of the size of the public sector: the public sector size corresponds to an
18.1% uniform tax rate.
It is useful to compare our REUT calculations in this numerical example with
traditional public ﬁnance measures used in the literature. One such measure is the
"tax burden". Calculating the average eﬀective trade tax at the reference equilibrium
as the ratio of tax revenues over tax base, gives us a TI1 =0 .1814.T h i si sn o te x a c t l y
the same as our REUT, indicating that the two methods are diﬀerent.19
19As it is well known, the eﬀective average tax has no normative value. Still, we could induce a
normative assesment if we were: (i) calculating the average eﬀective tax at the optimal equilibrium
TI
0,a n d( i i )c o m p a r i n gTI
1 and TI
0.S t e p( i )g i v e su saTI
0 =0 .2197, implying a tax burden of
21.97%. Step (ii) reveals that the average reference trade tax does not diﬀer substantially from the
optimal average eﬀective tax (TI
1/TI
0 =0 .8258). However, the tax burden indices were not designed
to measure the optimality of the tax structure. Our TOI is designed for measuring optimality and,tax optimality index 25
6. Concluding Remarks
We have proposed a new measure of tax ineﬃciency, viz. the Tax Optimality Index.
Its advantage is its intuitive and informative interpretation: it tells immediately
how eﬃcient are the current taxes. For example, a TOI equal to 0.8 implies that
current taxes are 80% eﬃcient, or in other words, that a 20% reduction of the optimal
taxes will bring welfare down to the current (distorted) welfare level. The type of
information that the index conveys can easily be compared between countries and
time, and thereby it avoids a basic defect possessed by the excess burden measure of
ineﬃciency (calculated either as an equivalent or compensating variation).
We illustrated our methods by considering a numerical example. Admittedly,
the true application of our method is to take it to the data and compute TOIs for
diﬀerent countries and time periods. That, remains to be done.
as indicated above, gives a result TOI =0 .7972, indicating a somewhat bigger tax ineﬃciency than
the one derived using relative tax burden measures.tax optimality index 26
Appendix: The Model with Indirect and Direct Taxes
In addition to the traded goods mentioned in section 2 of the paper, we now assume
the existence of N non-traded goods, whose price vector w is endogenously deter-
m i n e db ym a r k e t sw i t h i nt h ec o u n t r y .T h e r eare two types of non-tradeables: private
goods, whose characteristics makes them non-tradeable, and factors with elastic sup-
ply and no possibility of international mobility. However, as long as both markets
clear competitively and factor supplies are elastic, there is no modelling advantage in
distinguishing between the two. To simplify, we assume that all N non-traded goods
are factors facing an endogenous (factor) price w, while the only private goods are
the M traded ones facing a ﬁxed world price p.
The government raises revenues by taxing the consumption of private goods and
by taxing factors’ income. Denote t the (M × 1) vector of ad-valorem indirect taxes
and τ the (N × 1) vector of ad-valorem direct taxes.
The consumer decisions are characterized by the expenditure function e((1 + t) ·
p,(1−τ)·w,g,u), which denotes the minimum expenditure needed to achieve utility
level u, given consumer prices (1+t)·p, after-tax factor prices (1−τ)·w and a level
g of the public good.20 Standard properties of this function imply, in addition to the
properties mentioned in section 2, that ew is the vector of factor supplies.
Let the restricted revenue function r(p,w,g) to denote the value of total income
generated in the private sector given producer prices p, producer factor prices w and
the level of the provision of the public good g. The new property to note here is that
20There is arguably a tension between the assumption of a representative agent and that of many
factors. However, we can easily consider the case of many agents if we assume the existence of a
social welfare function that a government maximises by use of lump-sum transfers.tax optimality index 27
rw denotes the vector of factor demands.
The net expenditure function E is deﬁned as
E((1 + t)p,(1 − τ)w,g,u)=e((1 + t)p,(1 − τ)w,g,u) − r(p,w,g).
The price gradient Ew = ew − rw is the vector of excess factor supply.
The equilibrium of our economy is described by the following three equations:
E((1 + t) · p,(1 − τ) · w,g,u)=−rgg (A1)
(t · p)
0 ep +( τ · w)
0 ew = −rgg (A2)
Ew =0 . (A3)
The ﬁrst equation is the private sector’s budget constraint expressed in domestic
prices. The second equation is the public sector budget constraint, equating tax
revenues and total costs. Finally, the third equation ensures that the factor markets
clear.
We can solve the last two equations together expressing w and g as functions of
t,τ, and u,i . e . w = w(t,τ,u) and g = g(t,τ,u). Substituting these into the ﬁrst
equation, and rewriting the private budget constraint as a balance of trade function,
we have:
B(t,τ,u) ≡ E((1 + t) · p,(1 − τ) · w(·),g(·),u)+rg(p,w(·),g(·))g(·)=0 . (A4)
Equation (A4) represents the general equilibrium budget constraint for the economy,tax optimality index 28
making sure that the markets for the non-tradeable goods (both the factor markets
and the public good market) are in equilibrium and that consumers and the gov-





≡ min{δ : B(δt0,δτ0,u 1)=0 }. (A5)
Thus, the Tax Optimality Index T
¡
t0,τ0,u 1¢
is the proportion of the optimal tax
vectors that achieves the same level of welfare u1 as achieved by the observed tax
vectors t1,τ 1.T h u s , t h e TOI developed in the paper is readily extended to this
more general context.
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